

PHAROS AND THE QUESTION OF ROMAN TREATIES OF ALLIANCE IN THE GREEK EAST IN THE THIRD CENTURY B.C.E.

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IN A RECENT STIMULATING ARTICLE, P. S. Derow has proposed pushing back to 229/8 B.C.E. the date at which Rome began to conclude formal treaties of alliance with the Greek states east of the Adriatic. In other words, it was in the immediate aftermath of the Romans' very first military intervention in the Greek East—the First Illyrian War—that Rome established a whole series of formal and legally binding alliances. Derow bases this reconstruction on an interpretation of two long but fragmentary inscriptions from the island of Hvar (ancient Pharos), which are evidently part of a single continuous text. Part of the inscription was published in the nineteenth century; another, larger, part was published by L. Robert in 1960, along with a close examination of what was now seen as a single text. The inscription refers briefly to a *συνμαχία* between the Romans and the inhabitants of Pharos. This *συνμαχία* was now (it seems) being renewed as part of a larger diplomatic interaction between Pharos and Rome, after a period of deep trouble and destruction at Pharos.¹

Derow proposes that the brief reference on the Pharos inscription to a relationship of *συνμαχία* that was now apparently being renewed is in fact a reference to a formal treaty of alliance sworn between Rome and Pharos in 229/8 B.C.E., at the end of the First Illyrian War. He further proposes that the terms of this formal treaty were parallel to those found on the recently discovered inscription recording a treaty of alliance between Rome and Maroneia in Thrace, dating from the 160s B.C.E., and parallel as well to the terms that Polybius 23.9.12 implies existed in the treaty of alliance between Rome and the Achaean League, a treaty dating (probably) from circa 190. That is: there were reciprocal explicit obligations not to give aid of any sort (with specifics listed) to the enemies of either contracting party, and an

1. P. S. Derow, "Pharos and Rome," *ZPE* 88 (1991): 261–70. On the complex history of the publication of the inscription, see L. Robert, "Inscription hellénistique de Dalmatie," *BCH* 59 (1935): 489–90, for "Part B" of the inscription (hereafter: Robert, "Inscription, 1935"), and "Inscriptions hellénistiques de Dalmatie," in *Hellenica* XI–XII, ed. L. Robert (Paris, 1960), 507–8, for "Part A" of the inscription (hereafter: Robert, "Inscriptions, 1960").

explicit obligation actually to provide aid, if one could, to the other contracting party if the latter were attacked.²

This new explication of the Pharos inscription has a far-reaching historical impact. First, Derow immediately goes on to argue from the alleged example of the Roman treaty of alliance with Pharos that this treaty was not the only treaty of alliance sworn by Rome in Illyria in 229/8 B.C.E. Rather, it was only one of an extensive series of such formal and legally binding treaties that the Romans established in 229/8 with the Greek poleis of the Adriatic coast, and perhaps with some of the inland tribes as well.³

The Pharos inscription in this way becomes established as a central piece of evidence in the ongoing controversy over the nature of early Roman relations with the polities of Illyria—Rome's first expansionist steps into the Greek East. E. Badian, in a famous study, argued that the states and tribes in Illyria were linked to Rome after the First Illyrian War merely by informal, extralegal, and inherently flexible relationships of *officium* (moral "duty") in reciprocity for the *beneficia* (various "favors") that the Romans had done for these polities in 229/8, especially the "favor" of accepting them into Roman *fides* ("good faith"). Badian held that this status of treaty-less friend of Rome was modeled on the Roman social institution of *clientela*.⁴ The hypothesis of an Illyrian system of "client states" linked to Rome by informal obligation was challenged by K.-E. Petzold, who argued that the Illyriote poleis and the Illyrian tribes continued after 229/8 to conduct themselves as they had before, on the basis of calculating self-interest and *Machtpolitik*, that is, independently.⁵

A completely opposite interpretation of the situation has been put forth by J.-L. Ferrary, who agrees with Badian and Petzold that the Illyrian communities did not have treaties with Rome, but who nevertheless argues from their apparent status in various third-party treaties that they were officially regarded by the Romans and by others as subject to Rome.⁶ And if Derow's interpretation of the Pharos inscription is correct, then we will have to see the Roman hold on the polities of Illyria as much firmer than even Ferrary proposes. They had not been bound to Rome merely by informal obligations, nor were they under some sort of broad hegemony; rather they had been locked into subjugation to Roman interests by formal, sworn treaties of alliance.

And more is involved than merely Illyria. If Derow's hypothesis is accepted, then we will have to recast as well the general historical understanding not only of the mechanisms and the goals of early Roman diplomacy, but also of Roman military action east of the Adriatic. M. Holleaux argued in a famous and influential study seventy-five years ago that the Romans

2. The Maroneia inscription, published in 1983: see *SEG* 35. 823. Commentary: Derow, "Pharos and Rome," (note 1 above), 269–70.

3. *Ibid.*, 267–68.

4. E. Badian, "Notes on Roman Policy in Illyria (230–201 B.C.)," in *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford, 1964), 1–33, first published in *PBSR* 20 (1952): 72–93.

5. K.-E. Petzold, "Rom und Illyrien," *Historia* 20 (1971): 214–15.

6. J.-L. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme: Aspects idéologiques de la conquête romaine du monde hellénistique* (Rome, 1988), 24–33, esp. 31–32.

had few if any connections, or interests, or indeed “policies” at all in the Greek East before circa 200 B.C.E. and the outbreak of the Second Macedonian War.⁷ Holleaux’s thesis continues to have important defenders (notably Walbank and Gruen), but the hypothesis of Roman lack of interest in the world east of the Adriatic and, more generally, the conception of Roman imperialism as basically defensive, from which it derives, have been under sustained attack ever since W. V. Harris’ groundbreaking *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* in 1979.⁸ Derow’s interpretation of the Pharos inscription would strongly support Harris’ view of Rome as a consciously expansionist state in the East. If already by 228 B.C.E. the Roman Republic had concluded half a dozen (and perhaps more) formal treaties of alliance with the cities and tribes of Illyria, then this would have created legal connections and concrete interests indeed, and would be a powerful indication that Rome, right from the time of the First Illyrian War, was pursuing a diplomatically aggressive and highly interventionist policy in the Greek world. That, in fact, is one of Derow’s main points.⁹

Derow’s interpretation of the Pharos inscription—along with its broad implications regarding Rome and the Greeks from circa 230 B.C.E.—has now been widely accepted, for example, by A. Coppola’s comprehensive study of Demetrius of Pharos (the great warlord who played a central role in both the First and Second Illyrian Wars) and by H. Heftner, in a major new book on Roman expansion in the Mediterranean. Above all, it has received the *imprimatur* of C. Habicht, in his new history of Hellenistic Athens. The thesis thus seems well on its way to becoming the established scholarly *communis opinio*.¹⁰ Derow is certainly right to draw scholars’ attention to the Pharos inscription, and no future discussion of Roman expansion into the Greek world will be complete without a consideration of this text. It is my contention, however, that Derow’s interpretation of the information provided by the Pharos inscription is not the only possible interpretation, or even the most likely one. In fact, Derow’s conclusions, both about the Pharos inscription and the broader view of Roman relations in Illyria and the East based upon it, should not be accepted. The date of the inscription is uncertain; the Romans may have had some sort of control over Pharos, but the Pharians do not present it that way; and the inscription does not indicate the existence of a treaty of alliance.

The present paper is presented as part of the intense debate about Rome’s relationship with the polities of the Illyrian coast in the third century B.C.E. It is a subject with important implications both for the character of Rome’s

7. M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au III^e siècle avant J.-C.* (273–205) (Paris, 1921).

8. Defenders of Holleaux: see F. W. Walbank, “Polybius and Rome’s Eastern Policy,” *JRS* 53 (1963): 1–13; E. S. Gruen, *The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), esp. chaps. 1, 2, and 5; W. V. Harris’ important attack: *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome* (Oxford, 1979), chaps. 1–3, and 5.

9. See Derow, “Pharos and Rome,” 268–70.

10. A. Coppola, *Demetrio di Faro* (Rome, 1993), 123–27; H. Heftner, *Der Aufstieg Roms vom Pyrrhos-krieg bis zum Fall von Karthago* (Regensburg, 1997), 186, cf. 317 for the implication of Roman aggressiveness; C. Habicht, *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, trans. D. L. Schneider (Cambridge, MA, 1997), 185, cf. 194–95 for the implication of Roman aggressiveness.

early involvement in the East and for the character of Roman relationships with weaker states.

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The crucial passage in the Pharos inscription is A, lines 3–10, and reads as follows (reading with Robert and Derow):

- 3 [ἐπειδὴ Ῥωμαίων ἡ σύγκλη]ητος καὶ ὁ δῆμος φί-
- 4 [λοι ὑπάρχοντες καὶ εὖνους] τῇ πόλει τῇ Φαρίων
- 5 [ἐκ προγόνων ἀποδεδοκότες] ἡμῖν τὴν τε πόλιν
- 6 [ἡμῶν καὶ τοὺς πατρίους] νόμους καὶ χώρας ἡ-
- 7 [τις ὑπῆρχεν τῇ πόλει ἐν] τῇ νήσῳ ἔδωκαν ἡμῖν
- 8 [-----] τεσσ[α]ράκοντα καὶ τὴν συμμα-
- 9 [χίαν καὶ φιλίαν καὶ τᾶλλ]α φιλάνθρωπα ἐποίησαν
- 10 [κύρια, δεδόχθαι τῷ δῇ]μοι . . .

Other passages in the text that are relevant to our discussion reveal that Pharos sent envoys to ask the people of Paros for aid in reconstructing the severely damaged city, on grounds of kinship (A, lines 10–40); that a similar embassy was sent to another city—unknown, but in all probability Athens—on similar grounds of kinship (A, lines 11 and 15); that the envoys were well received at Paros, and received promises of aid and new colonists (A, lines 34–35); and in addition, that the people of Paros sent an ambassador to the oracle of Delphi, to ask what the Pharians should do in their current situation (B, lines 15–25, with the beginning of the answer of the god).¹¹

We see from the inscription that Pharos was facing a grave crisis. In 1935, when only fragment B was known, Robert hypothesized that the destruction at Pharos that required such extensive repairs and the replenishment of the population of the city was the result of serious attacks by Illyrian pirates.¹² But with Robert's publication of fragment A in 1960, it became clear that the Romans were major participants in the events that led to the destruction at Pharos discussed in the inscription. Apparently the Pharians had gotten caught up in a war involving Rome. If they were not active belligerents, then they were collateral victims of the fighting, for the inscription makes it certain that they had offered *deditio* (complete surrender) to the Romans. Thus lines 5–10 of A indicate that the Senate and People of Rome had “restored” to the Pharians the city itself, the Pharians’ ancestral laws, and their territory.¹³ But though Pharos suffered greatly in this war (probably—but not certainly—at the hands of a Roman army), and had

11. Paros was the mother city of Pharos, so it was a natural source of aid; for convincing arguments that the second city to which the Pharians appealed was Athens (the metropole of Paros, and hence the “grand-mother” city of Pharos), see Robert, “Inscriptions, 1960,” 524–25. The identification is accepted by Derow, “Pharos and Rome,” 263, and by Habicht, *Athens* (n. 10 above), p. 185, n. 42.

12. Robert, “Inscription, 1935,” 503–7.

13. *Deditio*: see Robert, “Inscriptions, 1960,” 517 and 538. Compare lines 5–10 of A with, e.g., lines 5–10 of the recently discovered inscription recording the *deditio* of the Spanish Seano[censes] in 104 B.C.E.: see D. Nörr, *Aspekte des römischen Völkerrechts: Die Bronzetafel von Alcántara* (Munich, 1989), esp. chaps. 4, 5, and 6. Although the most obvious and likely reconstruction is that the Romans themselves had wrecked Pharos, the inscription does not give direct evidence of this. Thus one cannot eliminate the possibility that during Illyrian fighting with Rome, *Illyrians* had destroyed much of Pharos, and that the Pharians,

eventually given *deditio* to the Romans, the city did not suffer juridically as a result, or lose its status as an independent polity (though theoretically this could have happened), precisely because the Senate and People restored legal independence to the Pharians.¹⁴ In addition—and here we have the crux of our discussion—the inscription introduces the Romans as φί[λοι of the Pharians (A, line 3), and appears to refer to a συμμα[χία καὶ φιλία between the Romans and the Pharians (A, lines 8–9).

The inscription is in a poor state of preservation; the entire left-hand side of the portion most relevant to us is missing. Obviously one must proceed with caution, and two fundamental questions need to be resolved (as much as they can) before we proceed further. First, was the relationship between Rome and the Pharians on the stone actually called συμμαχία καὶ φιλία? Only συμμα[is extant. But the restoration συμμα[χίαν καὶ φιλίαν was strongly argued by Robert, and is accepted by Derow. The restoration fits admirably into the space, and it conforms to the warm tone of the immediately subsequent reference to τῶν φίλων φιλάνθρωπα (line 9). Above all, it conforms to the introduction of the Romans on the inscription as φί[λοι of the Pharians: “la mention de la φιλία paraît ensuite indispensable.” There is therefore no reason not to accept that on the inscription the relationship between Rome and the Pharians was called not simply συμμαχία but rather συμμαχία καὶ φιλία. This finding is of great importance for later discussion.¹⁵

Second, commentators on the Pharos inscription all accept that it records the restoration of a previously existing relationship between Rome and the Pharians.¹⁶ But this is a somewhat more difficult issue. There is no space in lines 8–9 of A for traditional terminology such as ἀνενεώσαντο, and the only extant verbs in lines 3–10 are ἔδωκαν (line 7—which hardly suggests renewal) and ἐποίησαν (line 9).¹⁷ What one must argue, as Robert did, is that since the whole point of lines 3–10 of A is to praise the restoration of a happy preexisting situation for Pharos that had collapsed with the Pharian *deditio*, and since it is certain that Rome is restoring the city and its traditional laws and territory (lines 5–7), and since the συμμα[χία καὶ φιλία with Rome is mentioned without fanfare (lines 8–9), it makes sense to include it

having previous friendly relations with Rome, fled to the Romans for protection, offering *deditio*. This seems much less likely, of course, than the first hypothesis, but strictly speaking, we cannot tell. On serious troubles in the Adriatic from Illyrian raids in the second century, see Robert, “Inscription, 1935,” 503–7; on voluntary *deditio* to Rome in the face of a threat from a third party, see A. Heuss, *Die völkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der römischen Aussenpolitik Republikanischer Zeit* (Leipzig, 1933), 81–82.

14. See Robert, “Inscriptions, 1960,” pp. 511; 537; 539, n. 1; cf. Derow, “Pharos and Rome,” 267.

15. Robert on the restoration τὴν συμμα[χίαν καὶ φιλίαν: “Inscriptions, 1960,” 512, reiterated in *Bulletin épigraphique* (BÉ) 76 (1963): 144; the restoration accepted by L. Braccési, *Grecità adriatica* (Bologna, 1977), 322–23; by Derow, “Pharos and Rome,” 262 (though it hurts his case); by Coppola, *Demetrio di Faro* (n. 10 above), 216–17. For the complex implications of phrases such as συμμαχία καὶ φιλία, see pp. 406–11 below.

16. Robert, “Inscriptions, 1960,” 517, 537, 539; reiterated in BÉ 76 (1963): 144; J. Bousquet, “Inscription hellénistique de Dalmatie,” *BCH* 85 (1961): 592; Braccési, *Grecità adriatica*, 322–23; Derow, “Pharos and Rome,” 264–70; Coppola, *Demetrio di Faro*, 117 and 126; Heftner, *Der Aufstieg Roms* (n. 10 above), p. 446, n. 23.

17. Bousquet, “Inscription” (n. 16 above), 592, suggests the restoration τὴν συμμα[χίαν ἀνενεώσαντο καὶ τῶν φίλων φιλάνθρωπα in lines 8–9, but even this is too long for the space and, as we have seen, a reference to φιλία is required: cf. Robert, BÉ 76 (1963): 144.

among the many items now happily being restored after the *deditio*.¹⁸ In other words, the purpose of lines 3–10 of A is merely to describe the political preconditions that permitted the Pharians, despite their previous *deditio*, to renew their freedom of diplomatic action and act once more on their own behalf internationally by sending out embassies (the latter are the main topic of the inscription); the whole emphasis, then, is on renewal. And Robert's suggested phraseology for sealing the renewal (ἐποίησαν | κύρια, lines 8–9) is amply attested in Polybius, whose language often reflects that of official documents.¹⁹ Moreover, if the συμμα[χία καὶ φιλία referred to briefly on the inscription was a brand-new relationship with Rome, one would expect far more emphasis on it. Therefore, in the arguments that follow, I accept (as other scholars have) that the συμμα[χία καὶ φιλία referred to in lines 8–9 of A is most likely a relationship being restored after the Pharian *deditio*. This thesis, however, must always be explicitly defended.

Let us now turn to the even more controversial aspects of the Pharian inscription: the date of the inscription, and hence its historical context and meaning. The present condition of the stone offers us no explicit internal clue as to its date, but, depending upon the date one imputes to the inscription, its historical context (and thus its meaning) will be sharply different. And there are two major contenders as to date, differing by up to seventy years from each other.

Robert noted that the situation described in lines 3–10 of A generally fits with what we know of conditions on Pharos in the immediate aftermath of the Second Illyrian War (219 B.C.E.). That war was waged by the Romans against the Adriatic dynast Demetrius of Pharos, a former supporter of theirs; and the island and city of Pharos became Demetrius' last refuge when the Romans had defeated him elsewhere. Roman forces eventually invaded the island, forced Demetrius to flee, and took the city of Pharos by assault. Both Polybius and Appian say that the Roman army razed Pharos to the ground; yet it is also clear that Pharos was soon rebuilt, for Polybius 7.9.13, recording the terms of the treaty of alliance between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedon in 215 B.C.E., shows the city back in existence.²⁰ The parallel with the situation described on the Pharos inscription—where we find a devastated Pharos, restored to its previous legally free status by the Romans, simultaneously seeking physical reconstruction because of severe damage caused by a war—seems strong.²¹

Yet in the end Robert rejected 219/8 B.C.E. and the aftermath of the Second Illyrian War as the date and historical context of the Pharos inscription.

18. Robert, "Inscriptions, 1960," 512 and 517.

19. Ibid., p. 512 and n. 2, citing Polyb. 3.13.4; and see also Polyb. 6.14.11 and 6.15.9. On the numerous parallels between Polybius' language and that found on official inscriptions, see J. and L. Robert, *BE* 74 (1961): 189 and 197–200 (examples), with the comments of L. Robert, *BE* 76 (1963): 144.

20. The razing of Pharos in 219: Polyb. 3.19.12; App. *Ill.* 8. It is doubted by G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, vol. 3, part 1 (Turin, 1916), p. 325, n. 150, because Pharos continued to coin money down to c. 150. But the story makes sense, given Roman practices when forced to take a city by assault; the continued existence of Pharos is to be ascribed to its having quickly been rebuilt: see Badian, "Notes" (n. 4 above), p. 31, n. 75; Robert, "Inscriptions, 1960," p. 538 and n. 6.

21. See Robert's summation, "Inscriptions, 1960," 537–38.

Robert argued, first, that the letter forms and scribal usages on the inscription, especially the infrequency of *iota* adscript in words in the dative ending with a vowel, excluded any third-century (even late-third-century) date for the inscribing of this text; rather, the letter forms as well as the scribal usages pointed to a date well into the mid-second century.²² Second, Robert argued that the reference in A, lines 8–9 to a *συμμαχία* between Rome and Pharos similarly pointed to a second-century date, since the Romans were not concluding legally binding *foedera socialia* in Illyria or anywhere else in the Greek East as early as 219/8.²³ Third, Robert asserted that, since the *συμμαχία* between Rome and Pharos was evidently being renewed at the time of the inscription, a 219/8 date was particularly impossible, for the Romans had given Pharos to the dynast Demetrius in 229/8 as his personal possession at the end of the First Illyrian War, as part of his reward for his actions on Rome's behalf during that war. Thus, any diplomatic interaction between Rome and the Pharians in 219/8 would have been their *first* direct contact, their *first* such interaction; how then could anything have been “renewed”?²⁴ As an alternative explanation for the situation indicated by the inscription, Robert therefore opted for the hypothesis of previously unknown but very serious troubles between Pharos and Rome circa 170–150 B.C.E. Perhaps these troubles were connected somehow with the anti-Roman policies and behavior of the Illyrian king Genthius, who had sided with Perseus against Rome in the Third Macedonian War (172–168); perhaps the troubles were connected with anti-Roman behavior by the mysterious mid-second-century Illyrian warlord Ballaios, who had some control over Pharos.²⁵

Robert recognized the inherent weakness of his mid-second-century reconstruction of the background of the Pharos inscription when compared to the historically certain and well-known events of 219.²⁶ And there were always scholars who preferred a late-third-century date for the inscription.²⁷ It is Derow, however, who has now presented the first thorough re-analysis of all of Robert's arguments, rejecting Robert's opposition to a 219/8 date for the inscription. It is best to proceed by examining Derow's arguments seriatim.

First, Derow makes a good case that Robert's attempt to place the Pharos inscription in the mid-second century on the basis of letter forms and scribal usages cannot be pressed. Robert worked merely from Brunšmid's 1898 text and photograph for B, and from two photographs and a squeeze sent to him

22. Ibid., 539–40; see already Robert's comments on the script and scribal usages in regard to fragment B alone in “Inscription, 1935,” 505.

23. Robert, “Inscriptions, 1960,” 538: the cities and tribes of Illyria were only “protégés” of the Romans from 228, i.e., not legal allies.

24. Robert, “Inscriptions, 1960,” 539.

25. Ibid., 540–41.

26. Ibid.

27. Thus Braccési, *Grecità adriatica*, 322–37, argued that there were no political grounds not to date the inscription to the period of the First Macedonian War (212/1–205 B.C.E.), when a hard-pressed Rome would not herself have been able to help Pharos; and F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 3 (Oxford, 1979), 765, leans towards accepting Braccési. But Braccési's discussion is weakened by a failure to address Robert's epigraphical arguments against placing the inscription in the third century.

by two Yugoslavian scholars for A.²⁸ Derow has the advantage of having been able in 1975 to inspect each of the two separate fragments of the inscription personally (A on Hvar, B in Zagreb), and then to make his own photographs for later study.²⁹ Derow's new examination of the stone shows that Robert's arguments concerning the letter forms cannot be sustained.³⁰ As for scribal usages, Derow shows that the employment of *iota* adscript (especially after *omega*) is more common on the inscription than Robert had thought from the photographs and the squeeze in his possession.³¹ This suggests that on the basis of epigraphical style, the stone could well be earlier than Robert thought: a late-third-century date cannot now be excluded.³²

On the other hand, a mid-second-century date cannot be excluded on epigraphical grounds either. For instance, *iota* adscript turns out to be employed with words in the dative ending in *omega*, suggesting an earlier date; it is not, however, employed at all with words in the dative ending with *eta* (and there are perhaps eleven such cases on the inscription), which suggests a later date. Indeed, Derow's own readings here have increased the number of perceived cases of this "later" scribal usage.³³ The inscription may, after all, therefore be "late" (i.e., mid-second century). The problem is made more complicated by the fact that we have few datable Greek inscriptions from the Illyrian region with which to compare the Pharos stone. Another complication is that in general the execution of the writing on the inscription is, as Robert says, "assez rapide et négligé."³⁴

The conclusion from the purely epigraphical considerations must therefore be that on the basis of epigraphical style, the Pharos inscription cannot be securely dated. It may belong to the late third century B.C.E.; it may be as late as the mid-second century. We simply do not know.³⁵

This brings us to the nonepigraphical arguments and indirect evidence adduced by Derow to support the idea that the Pharos inscription does indeed reveal a treaty of alliance between Rome and Pharos being renewed in 219/8 B.C.E. Robert asserted that the Pharos inscription could not refer to

28. Robert's use of J. Brunšmid, *Die Inschriften und Münzen der griechischen Städte Dalmatiens* (Vienna, 1898), pp. 17–20, n. 4, for B: see "Inscription, 1935," p. 489 and n. 2. Robert's use of the Yugoslavian photographs and squeeze for A: see "Inscriptions, 1960," p. 508 and n. 2. (He owed the photographs and squeeze to D. Rendić-Miočević and A. Raubitschek: *ibid.*)

29. Derow, "Pharos and Rome," p. 261 n. 4.

30. Robert argued that the form of *zeta* in both A, line 1, and B, line 19, appeared to be post-third-century ("Inscriptions, 1960," 540; cf. "Inscription, 1935," 506). But Derow demonstrates that there are in fact no *zetas* on the inscription at all ("Pharos and Rome," 266). Similarly, Robert argued that the forms of *alpha* and *pi* appeared to be "late" ("Inscription, 1935," 505–6 [no discussion in 1960]); but Derow shows that these letter forms are actually highly variable on the inscription ("Pharos and Rome," 266). Thus no conclusion as to date can be drawn from this material.

31. Derow, "Pharos and Rome," 266, which is convincing.

32. *Ibid.*, 266–67.

33. In Derow's reading of the inscription, there are eleven cases of *eta* as an ending vowel in the dative without use of *iota* adscript: A, lines 4 (twice), 16, and 26 (twice); B, lines 9, 11, and 15 (twice). Some of these *etas* in the dative without *iota* adscript are restorations, however. But note that in B, line 11, Derow reads ἐν τῇ πόλει ("Pharos and Rome," 263), where Robert accepted ἐν τῇ πόλει ("Inscription, 1935," 490, though cf. 506; "Inscriptions, 1960," 528). This actually increases the number of "late" *eta* usages on the inscription beyond Robert's findings.

34. Robert, "Inscriptions, 1935," 505—an assessment agreed to by Derow, "Pharos and Rome," 266.

35. Indeed, Robert's final comment on the inscription is that the question of its date "ne nous paraît pas actuellement susceptible d'une solution": *BÉ* 89 (1976): 485.

such a treaty because the Romans were not concluding treaties of alliance in the East as early as 219/8 (see p. 401 above). The argument is unfortunately circular, and Derow seeks to undermine it by contending that the recorded military actions of many Illyriote poleis in support of Rome from 229/8 B.C.E. onwards, as well as the terminology employed to describe the relationship between these communities and Rome, are indications that Rome had in fact concluded legally binding treaties of alliance with them. Thus we know that after Apollonia, Corcyra, Epidamnus, and Issa came under Roman protection in 229 during the First Illyrian War, these city-states (and other places too) served regularly as landing or staging points for Roman forces, or even contributed auxiliary troops and/or ships to those Roman forces; this happened during Rome's wars against Philip V, Antiochus III, and Perseus.³⁶ Sometimes these cities are even said ῥωμαίοις συμμαχεῖν (Corcyra: cf. App. *Mac.* 1), or are actually termed σύμμαχοι (Oricum and Apollonia: Zonar. 9.4) or *socii* (Issa: Livy 42.26.6) of the Romans. So, too, are inland tribes such as the Bassanitae (Livy 44.30.7–8 and 11), and perhaps the Bassanitae were not alone.³⁷ Derow ends by seriously questioning whether all this military activity on behalf of Rome, and the terminology associated with it, should not be taken as evidence of formal alliances, and “whether anyone who was not allied with Rome so participated in these wars.”³⁸ Rhodes is the only exception Derow allows to his general rule that the Eastern polities were legal and not merely *de facto* allies of Rome, and he says that it was precisely the failure of Rhodes to have a treaty of alliance that the ancients found unusual (cf. Polyb. 30.5.6–9).³⁹ But if the Illyriote cities and even some inland tribes all had early treaties of alliance with Rome, then this is the general historical context in which to see the Pharos inscription; conversely, the explicit reference on the Pharos inscription to a συμμαχία with Rome strengthens the case for widespread early *foedera* in Illyria. This in turn opens up a new perspective on early Roman policy throughout the Greek East, and the mechanisms of that policy.⁴⁰

Decades of scholarship, however, have definitively shown that in the period 212–146 B.C.E., the Romans often fought their wars in the Greek East alongside “allies” who were not in possession of formal treaties of alliance. The motivations behind the energetic conduct of these Eastern states in fighting on the side of the Romans varied according to circumstances, strategic concerns, and pragmatic self-interest (including greed for territory, fear of Rome's current enemy, and fear of Rome itself). But the contractual obligations deriving from sworn treaties were not involved.

The examples of this phenomenon are very extensive, and include both major and minor states. The Attalid kingdom of Pergamum is the most

36. Sources: see Derow, “Pharos and Rome,” p. 267, nn. 13 and 14.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 268 n. 21.

38. *Ibid.*, 267. Derow clearly means not just the Illyriotes but any Eastern polity: see p. 267, n. 16, with reference to the Aetolian League and the Rhodians; and p. 270, n. 28, with reference to the Achaean League (and cf. below).

39. Derow, “Pharos and Rome,” p. 267 n. 16.

40. *Ibid.*, 267–70.

obvious and striking case: the Attalid kings fought alongside Rome without any formal *foedus* in the First Macedonian War, the Second Macedonian War, the war against Nabis of Sparta (195 B.C.E.), the Syrian War, the Third Macedonian War, the Fourth Macedonian War, and the Achaean War.⁴¹ Similarly, Athens fought on the Romans' side without a treaty of alliance in the Second Macedonian War, the war against Nabis, and the Syrian War; the Achaean League did the same in the Second Macedonian War and the war against Nabis. The Aetolian League fought without a treaty in the Second Macedonian War (according to the Romans, at least). Philip V fought alongside Rome without a treaty in the Syrian War; Prusias II of Bithynia did the same during the Third Macedonian War, and so did Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia.⁴² As for the Rhodians' lack of a *foedus* with Rome, Polybius' point in 30.5.6–9 is not that this was an unusual situation *per se*, but that it was unusual given the fact that the Rhodians had consistently cooperated with Roman endeavors for such a long time (140 years, if the text is correct), and yet still did not have a legal treaty of alliance (see esp. 30.5.6).⁴³

Given all the above, it seems very dangerous methodology to leap from the bare fact that Illyriote states made minor contributions to Roman war efforts in this period to the conclusion that there must have existed formal treaties of alliance between all these poleis and Rome. Rather than actions mandated by treaty, the minor Illyriote contributions to Roman war efforts could simply be the politically and/or strategically wise actions of polities that were merely informal *amici* of Rome. The latter phenomenon seems to have occurred often enough in the Greek East. Indeed, Sallust has Adherbal of Numidia in North Africa, whose grandfather Massinissa had provided support to Rome both in the Second Macedonian War and the Third Macedonian War without having a legal treaty of alliance, explain exactly why it

41. For detailed discussion of the diplomacy here, see R. B. McShane, *The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum* (Urbana, 1964), 105–9 (the First Macedonian War), 123–24 (the Second Macedonian War), 138–39 (the war against Nabis), 142–46 (the Syrian War), 178–83 (the Third Macedonian War), 192 (the Fourth Macedonian War and the Achaean War).

42. On Athens in the Second Macedonian War, the war against Nabis, and the Syrian War, see Gruen, *Hellenistic World* (n. 8 above), 23–24. On the Achaean League in the Second Macedonian War and the war against Nabis, see E. Badian, "The Treaty between Rome and the Achaean League," *JRS* 42 (1952): 76–80; Badian presents strong arguments that the Achaean League did not receive a *foedus* with Rome until winter 192/1 B.C.E. On the Aetolians in the Second Macedonian War, see, e.g., G. A. Lehmann, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Glaubwürdigkeit des Polybios* (Münster, 1967), 78–81 and 107–10; the Aetolians claimed in 196 to have a *foedus* (based on the treaty of 212/1), but the Romans denied it. (Note the failed Roman attempt to involve Aetolia in the war in spring 199, Livy 31.29–32). On Philip V in the Syrian War, see E. S. Gruen, "The Supposed Alliance between Rome and Philip V of Macedon," *CSCA* 6 (1973): 123–26; although he was compensated for his aid by territorial gains (not as much as he wished), Philip never had a *foedus sociale* with Rome. On Prusias II of Bithynia (Roman-Bithynian relations), see A. M. Eckstein, "Rome, the War with Perseus, and Third Party Mediation," *Historia* 37 (1988): 437–43. On Ariarathes IV (Roman-Cappadocian relations [no *foedus sociale*]), see already P. C. Sands, *The Client Princes of the Roman Empire under the Republic* (Cambridge, 1908), 29–30 and 200–203; cf. Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 88. Whether Elis, Messene, and Sparta partook in the First Macedonian War on the basis of treaties with Rome is hotly debated; compare J. W. Rich, "Roman Aims in the First Macedonian War," *PCPhS* 210 (1984), p. 160, n. 29, with Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 77–78.

43. There is a famous controversy over whether the text of Polyb. 30.5.6 is corrupt (see Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce* [n. 7 above], 33–46, in contrast to H. H. Schmitt, *Rom und Rhodos* [Munich, 1957], 6–29), but the thrust of Polybius' meaning is clear enough.

was both wise and honorable for states having *amicitia* with Rome to act in such an energetic fashion.⁴⁴

If actions can therefore tell us little, what then about the argument from the terminology used by ancient writers to describe the specific relations between the Illyriote poleis and Rome? One must start not with Appian or Zonaras but with Polybius, our earliest and most detailed source on Illyrian events in the third century. He calls the relationships established by Rome in Illyria in 229 only *φιλία* or *πίστις* (2.11.5–6 and 10–11); there is never any mention of a *σύμμαχία*. Polybius is providing an explicit description of the overt content of the Roman diplomacy here, so this is more than an *argumentum e silentio*.⁴⁵ Of course, it is—barely—possible that Polybius did not bother to tell his readers that shortly after 229 the Romans converted all these informal friendships into sworn treaties of alliance,⁴⁶ yet Polybius' statements that Roman-Illyrian relations were based on *amicitia* and *fides* seem borne out in at least one important case. Cicero describes Dyrrachium (Epidamnus)—a place he knew well and which was, in addition, the strategic key to that part of the Adriatic coast—as a mere *civitas libera* in the mid-first century (i.e., not a *civitas foederata*).⁴⁷

Compared to the combined testimony of Polybius and Cicero, Appian's vague phrase *Ῥωμαίοις συνεμάχει* with reference to Corcyra (*Mac.* 1) has little impact, especially because Polybius specifically calls the Corcyrean relationship with Rome mere *φιλία* (2.11.6), and because the entire incident with Corcyra described in *Macedonica* 1 is fiction anyway.⁴⁸ Similarly, we need not have confidence in the legal exactitude of Zonaras' reference to Oricum and Apollonia as *σύμμαχοι* of the Romans attacked by Philip V (Zonar. 9.4). Zonaras is a late and summarizing source, and he has this incident in the wrong year. In Livy's parallel but much more detailed account of Philip's attack, Oricum and Apollonia appeal to Rome for help against him, but not on the basis of any treaty rights (24.40.2 and 7). If these places possessed formal *foedera* that contractually bound the Romans to protect them, why then do they fail in Livy to press such a claim?⁴⁹ Nor should

44. Sall. *Iug.* 14.12: "Ego [sc. Adherbal] sic existumabam, patres conscripti, uti praedicantem audiveram patrem meum, qui vestram amicitiam diligenter colerent, eos multum laborem suscipere, ceterum ex omnibus maxime tutos esse. quod in familia nostra fuit, praestitit, uti in omnibus bellis adesset vobis. . . ."

45. Pace Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme* (n. 6 above), 29.

46. Ibid.

47. Dyrrachium (Epidamnus) a *civitas libera*: Cic. *Fam.* 14.1.7. Cicero spent part of his exile in 58 B.C.E. there, and he had close relations with the citizenry (ibid.); there was no reason for him to keep silent if Dyrrachium had a formal *foedus*. It is this evidence, rather than Polybius, that convinces Ferrary that the Greek polities in Illyria never had treaties of alliance with Rome: *Philhellénisme et impérialisme*, 30–31. For the importance of this city for controlling the Adriatic coast, see esp. N. G. L. Hammond, "Illyris, Rome, and Macedon in 229–205 B.C.," *JRS* 58 (1968): 2 and 4.

48. For discussion of this latter point, see F. W. Walbank, *Philip V of Macedon* (Cambridge, 1940), 299.

49. Zonaras' wrong chronology: see Walbank, *Philip V* (n. 48 above), 299. Since Derow believes that Zonaras' description of Oricum and Apollonia as *σύμμαχοι* of the Romans means they each had a *foedus sociale* when Philip attacked them ("Pharos and Rome," 267), the fact that in Livy 24.40 Oricum appeals to Rome for help on completely different grounds from Apollonia already causes him unease (see p. 268 n. 18). Note that Livy is not shy about recording appeals for action based on *foedus* rights: see 1.32.3–4; 8.4.1 and 6.1; 21.10.3 and 13; 21.18.8 and 10–11; 23.10.6; 29.12.4; 30.26.4; 30.40.6; 31.46.3; 36.27.5; 42.40.6; 42.41.10.

much be made of Livy's own brief reference to the Issaeans as *socii* of Rome (42.26.6). First, the context is an incident of 172 B.C.E., much later than the period with which we are dealing. Second, the term *socii* in Livy is not limited to states possessing legally binding alliances: it can designate mere close association. There are multiple examples of this loose Livian usage.⁵⁰ In fact, in the very sentence to which Derow has pointed as Livian evidence for a Rome-Issa treaty of alliance, the coastal dependencies of Issa are themselves called *socii* of the Issaeans (*sociis suis*: 42.26.6 end), but the implication is certainly not that these towns possessed treaties of alliance with Issa, because earlier in 42.26 they are places within the *finēs* of the Issaeian state itself (26.2). Livy's point in 42.26.6 is therefore merely that these towns were somehow closely associated with Issa, and the same might hold for the reference in 42.26.6 to the Issaeans in their relationship with Rome.⁵¹

The terminology employed by some of the ancient history-writers is thus in itself of little use in proving that the Illyrian states possessed early treaties of alliance with Rome, and Polybius and Cicero provide very strong indications to the contrary. But the Pharos inscription is an official document. Can the terminology employed in other official documents from the Greek East help us to determine the exact nature of the Pharians' relationship with Rome as expressed on the inscription? If it can be shown, for instance, that the terminology of the Pharos inscription requires us to accept that the Pharians had come into possession of a *foedus sociale* with Rome (a *foedus sociale* that was now, apparently, being renewed), then that would have an impact on how we should interpret some of the loose phraseology of the history writers. We might then be able to return once more to the thesis that formal treaties of alliance were extended to the Greek cities of Illyria (and perhaps even to some inland tribes) from an early point in their interactions with Rome.

The phraseology of the Pharos inscription is indeed suggestive in some regard, but it does not *require* us to accept that the Pharians had a *foedus sociale* with Rome. The document is not, of course, a detailed record of a treaty of alliance, including the usual long list of treaty terms, that we find often enough elsewhere. The inscription contains only a brief allusion to the “συμμαχία” between the Pharians and Rome, and, while both Robert and Derow take this to mean a formal alliance, scholars also accept that the complete wording of the text was probably συμμαχία καὶ φιλίαν (A, lines 8–9).⁵² Similarly, as we have already noted, the Romans are introduced on the inscription merely as φίλοι of the Pharians (A, lines 3–4). Ferrary in fact thought the language of the inscription to be so ambiguous that—self-evidently—it was irrelevant to the question of whether Rome concluded early *foedera socialia* in Illyria.⁵³ Because of Derow's article, however, the arguments now need to be carefully spelled out.

50. The fundamental study is Sands, *Client Princes* (n. 42 above), 10–48 (with detailed supporting documentation at 163–228). See also Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 13–95.

51. On Issa and Rome, see further below, p. 408.

52. See pp. 399–400 above.

53. *Philhellénisme et impérialisme*, p. 31, n. 101.

The phraseology on the Pharos inscription has some resemblance to other official inscriptions from states in the Greek East where a relationship of *φιλία καὶ συμμαχία* with Rome is proclaimed. What should give us pause is that on many of those inscriptions, it is clear that no legally binding treaty of alliance is meant—only a close (if informal) association. The inscriptions all date from the 170s B.C.E. or later, that is, from a time when the Romans were indeed creating sworn treaty-relationships in the East. This makes the honorific nature of phrases such as *φιλία καὶ συμμαχία* on the inscriptions all the more worth noting.

Thus, in a Greek translation of a *senatus consultum* set up in the little town of Narthacium in Thessaly circa 140 B.C.E. (*SIG*³ 674), we learn that both the *δῆμος* of Narthacium and the *δῆμος* of neighboring Melitaea are excellent *φίλοι καὶ σύμμαχοι* of the Roman People (lines 16 and 21), and indeed that their “goodwill, friendship, and alliance” with the Roman People (*χάρिता, φιλίαν, συμμαχίαν*) are now in each case being renewed (lines 18 and 42), a situation not unlike the renewal of *συμμαχία καὶ φιλία* indicated on the Pharos inscription. But a short time later the relationship with Rome is summed up in both cases by the senatorial decree, and in both cases it is called simply *φιλία* (lines 21 and 47), that is, *amicitia* in the original Latin.⁵⁴ A translation of a letter from the praetor M. Aemilius to Magnesia and Priene in Asia Minor, from the middle of the second century B.C.E. or a little earlier, is similar (*SIG*³ 679.2B). Each is praised for being an excellent *φίλος καὶ σύμμαχος* of the Roman People (lines 41–42 and 43–44), but a little later in the inscription, the relationship of these two towns to Rome is summed up by the praetor simply as *φιλία* (line 54), that is, *amicitia* in the original Latin.⁵⁵ In 155 B.C.E., King Ptolemy VIII asserts on an inscription that his relationship with Rome is *φιλία καὶ συμμαχία* (*SEG* 9.7, lines 16–17), but he does not mean he has a formal treaty of alliance, for he goes on to hope that if it is ever necessary, the Romans will aid him because of his appeals to the gods, to justice, and to their own good reputation (lines 20–24); in fact, Livy describes the diplomatic relationship of the Ptolemaic kings to Rome in this period as simple *amicitia* (44.19.10).⁵⁶

Again, in a letter from the dictator Sulla to the town of Stratonicea in Caria in 81 B.C.E. (*OGI* 441), the town is praised for having resisted Mithridates VI, lauded for its “goodwill and loyalty and alliance with the Roman People” (*εὐνοία καὶ πίστις καὶ συμμαχία*, line 45), and this “benevolence and friendship and alliance” is then renewed (*χάρिता φιλίαν συμμαχίαν ἀνανεώσασθαι*, line 69), and finally the Stratoniceans are termed “our fine and good friends and allies” (*δῆμος καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος*

54. For text and commentary, see now S. Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations in the Greek World, 337–90 B.C.* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1996), 425–29 (no. 156). Ager accepts that the relationship between Melitaea and Rome, and between Narthacium and Rome, was merely *amicitia* (427). So also R. K. Sherk, *Roman Documents from the Greek East* (Baltimore, 1969), 52 (no. 9).

55. For text and commentary, see now Ager, *Interstate Arbitrations* (note 54 above), 321–27 (no. 120). See also (earlier) Sherk, *Roman Documents* (note 54 above), 44–47 (no. 7). Ager states that the relationship both of Magnesia and of Priene to Rome was *amicitia* (467).

56. On Ptolemy's inscription, see Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 47. On the Roman *amicitia* (nothing more) with the Ptolemies: *ibid.*, 675–77.

σύμμαχος τε ἡμέτερος, lines 71–72). The repetition of *σύμμαχος* here is striking, and almost obsessive, but does not mean that the Stratoniceans possessed a *foedus sociale* with Rome. On the contrary, earlier in the inscription, the relationship between Rome and Stratonicea before the Mithridatic War is characterized as *εὐνοιά τε καὶ πίστις καὶ φιλία*, with no mention of *σύμμαχος* (lines 36–37; cf. *φιλία καὶ εὐνοια* at line 78), and indeed it is precisely because of this *εὐνοιά τε καὶ χάρις* that the Stratoniceans are said to have taken the lead in resisting Mithridates (lines 11–12, cf. line 78). When we see that the Stratonicean envoys to Rome are *themselves* personally called *σύμμαχοί τε ἡμέτεροι* (line 71), the purely honorific nature of the title becomes clear; indeed, the town, far from being a free ally with a *foedus*, may well have been paying taxes to Rome after the war.⁵⁷

Moreover, we have a similar inscription from the Illyrian region itself. In 56 B.C.E., envoys from Traugarium, a coastal dependency of Issa, came to Caesar at his headquarters in Aquileia to present him with some sort of request. The response was contained in an official Roman document, on which it was mentioned that Issa had a relationship of *φιλία καὶ σύμμαχος* with the Roman People.⁵⁸ Derow believes the appearance of the word *σύμμαχος* in this document is enough to show the existence of a *foedus sociale* between Issa and Rome (thus confirming, indirectly, the widespread existence of treaties of alliance in Illyria).⁵⁹ But the Roman document is only one of a series of documents on a public stele recording the Traugarian affair and its resolution, and, in the document just above it, it appears that the Roman citizen C. Gavenius, in introducing the Traugarians and the Issaeans to Caesar, defined the relationship between Issa and the Romans simply as *φιλία*.⁶⁰ Gavenius' Latin word here must have been *amicitia* (and not even, say, *societas atque amicitia*); so the proconsul Caesar must have understood it. Gruen is therefore very likely to be correct in asserting that the relationship between Issa and Rome was always merely one of *amicitia*. There was no legally binding treaty of alliance.⁶¹

One might, however, argue that the Pharos inscription is somewhat different from all the above inscriptional evidence demonstrating the diplomatic vagueness of the phrase *φιλία καὶ σύμμαχος*. First, on the Pharos inscription this phrase appears, unusually, with the definite article (*τὴν συμμα[χίαν καὶ φιλίαν*, A, lines 8–9), which both Robert and Derow take as strong evidence that a specific treaty is meant and that a treaty relationship is now being renewed.⁶² Second, on the Pharos inscription there is an unusual reversal of terminology, with *σύμμαχος* apparently inscribed before

57. The Stratoniceans receive many favors from Rome in this letter, but immunity from provincial taxation is not among them: see A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C.–1 A.D.* (Norman, OK and London, 1984), 245 (with several parallel cases).

58. For text and commentary, see Sherk, *Roman Documents*, 139–42 (nos. 24A and B).

59. Derow, "Pharos and Rome," 268 (citing only Sherk, *Roman Documents*, 24B).

60. Sherk, *Roman Documents*, 24A, lines 12–14: *λόγους ἐποίησα[το περὶ τῆς τε] ἑλευ[θε]ρίας τῶν Ἰσσαιῶν καὶ τῆς φιλίας] τῶν Ῥωμαίων καὶ Ἰσσαιῶν-----].* Although *φιλία* is a restoration, it is a logical one and fits easily in the inscriptional space: cf. Sherk's commentary at 141.

61. Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 367–68.

62. Robert, "Inscriptions, 1960," 539 ("L'article τὴν συμμαχίαν est decisive . . ."); Derow, "Pharos and Rome," p. 265 and n. 8, cf. p. 269, n. 25.

φιλία (A, lines 9–10). Do these facts mean that, after all, a *foedus* with Rome is what the inscribers of the Pharian stone are describing?

They do not. Regarding the second aspect of the Pharian inscription, one may note a parallel in Livy 42.6, where envoys from Antiochus IV are depicted as emphasizing to the Senate the king's *societas atque amicitia* with Rome, that is, not the more usual *amicitia et societas* (6.8); they even proclaim him a *bonus fidelisque socius populi Romani* (ibid.); finally, it is proposed that the *societas* that had existed between Rome and the king's father Antiochus III should be renewed (*societatem renovare*, 6.10). The similarity with the situation apparently depicted on the Pharos inscription—the renewal of ἡ συμμαχία καὶ φιλία—is clear, except that the words of the Seleucid envoys are far more emphatic. Yet in fact the envoys' flowery phrases are merely meant to impress the Senate with the closeness of the Roman-Seleucid relationship—and to avert senatorial attention from the fact of Antiochus' failure to live up to the terms of the peace treaty with Rome (not a treaty of alliance) that his father had sworn (see 42.6.6). This is not evidence for the existence of a formal *foedus sociale*. We happen to know exactly what the nature of the Roman-Seleucid diplomatic relationship was, because Polybius has preserved for us the text of the Treaty of Apamea sworn between Rome and Antiochus III: it was φιλία (Polyb. 21.42.1). And Livy knew this as well: in the parallel passage (38.38.2), *amicitia* is the word he uses (cf. the reference to *comitas* between Rome and Antiochus at 42.6.9).⁶³

If unusual word order therefore tells us nothing solid about the exact meaning of the relationship between Rome and Pharos, neither does the unusual employment of the definite article (ἡ συμμαχία καὶ φιλία) on the Pharos inscription. The fact is that the definite article appears elsewhere in our diplomatic evidence with no implication of *foedus sociale*. Thus Polybius describes the diplomatic interaction when Ariarathes V of Cappadocia renewed the diplomatic relationship his father had had with Rome (163 B.C.E.) as ἀνανεωσόμενοι τὴν τε φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν τὴν προϋπάρχουσαν (31.3.1); the phraseology in Diodorus is parallel: ἀνε νέωσατο δ' οὗτος καὶ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους φιλίαν καὶ συμμαχίαν (31.19.8). W. R. Paton, the Loeb translator of Polybius, renders Polybius 31.3.1 as Ariarathes renewing “the previously existing alliance”; F. R. Walton, the Loeb translator of Diodorus, renders Diodorus 31.19.8 as Ariarathes having “renewed with Rome the treaty of alliance and friendship.”⁶⁴ But on this point both translators are wrong. The relationship with Rome established by the father of Ariarathes—the relationship that Ariarathes was renewing in 163—was, according to Polybius' account of the original diplomacy, merely φιλία (21.45.1),

63. Livy may be following a Polybian text in this account of Antiochus' embassy: so H. Tränkle, *Livius und Polybios* (Basel and Stuttgart, 1977), 28. But this is disputed: see H. Nissen, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die Quellen der vierten und fünften Dekade des Livius* (Berlin, 1863), 244. In any case, it is unlikely that Livy thought, or expected his readers to think, that the ambassadors of Antiochus were claiming to possess a *foedus sociale*.

64. W. R. Paton, *Polybius: The Histories*, vol. 6 (Cambridge, MA, 1927), loc. cit.; F. R. Walton, *Diodorus Siculus*, vol. 11 (Cambridge, MA, 1957), loc. cit.

that is, *amicitia* in the Livian parallel passage (38.39.6). Hence Livy went on to describe Ariarathes' diplomatic interaction with Rome in 163 as *amicitiam renovavit* (*Per.* 46).⁶⁵ The definite article, appearing so insistently in Polybius 31.3 and Diodorus 31.19 (ἡ φιλία καὶ συμμαχία), is therefore irrelevant: the diplomatic relationship between the Cappadocian royal house and the Romans was in this period one of *amicitia*, nothing more, as has long been recognized.⁶⁶ If the definite article is irrelevant to our understanding of the diplomatic relationship described in Polybius 31.3 and Diodorus 31.19 (ἡ φιλία καὶ συμμαχία), then one must accept the serious possibility that it is irrelevant to our understanding of the diplomatic relationship being described at Pharos as well.

In sum, the appearance of the phrase φιλία καὶ συμμαχία (or even the phrase ἡ συμμαχία καὶ φιλία) can never in itself automatically require us to believe that the subject under discussion is a *foedus sociale*. There are simply too many examples where this is not the case. That is, there are too many examples where the diplomatic relationship that is called—apparently for honorific reasons—φιλία καὶ συμμαχία is actually a relationship of informal *amicitia*: mere inter-state “friendship” with no formal, legally binding treaty of alliance. Both Derow and Robert were thus incautious in assuming that the appearance of the phrase ἡ συμμαχία καὶ φιλία on the Pharos inscription must mean that a formal treaty of alliance existed between Pharos and Rome.⁶⁷

But, because of the great flexibility (or perhaps vagueness) of the language of Roman external relations in the period with which we are dealing, the appearance of such a phrase does not *disprove* the existence of a treaty of alliance either. While the vast majority of examples where the phrase φιλία καὶ συμμαχία appears in our evidence do not refer to a treaty of alliance, there are a few cases where a treaty of alliance is exactly the subject. Thus a decree from near Pergamum circa 129 B.C.E. emphasizes the traditional εὔνοια καὶ φιλία of the Pergamene populace towards the Roman People (*SIG*³ 694, line 13), and then says that as a consequence the city has been received by the Romans into φιλία καὶ συμμαχία (lines 21–22, cf. 47–48). Yet this inscription does not celebrate an *amicitia* but a formal treaty, with provision that the specific terms of the φιλία καὶ συμμαχία (lines 47–48) are to be inscribed on bronze plaques both in Rome and in Pergamum (lines 27–32).⁶⁸ Again, the town of Astypalaea in 105 B.C.E. set up a translation of a *senatus consultum* that referred to the renewal of

65. One might hesitate to put much weight on the *Periochae*, but in this case we know that the term in *Per.* 46 is actually Livy's own term for the relationship between Cappadocia and Rome: *amicitia* (38.39.6; see above).

66. See Sands, *Client Princes*, 200–201; Heuss, *Grundlagen* (n. 13 above), 47; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 88.

67. For earlier discussions establishing that phrases such as συμμαχία καὶ φιλία could be employed in official contexts without implying a treaty, see Heuss, *Grundlagen*, 110; W. Dahlheim, *Struktur und Entwicklung des römischen Völkerrechts* (Munich, 1968): 165–66; Gruen, *Hellenistic World*, 65.

68. On the other hand, elsewhere on the inscription we are given a reference to ἡ συμμαχία pure and simple, in connection with [συνθῆκαι], lines 27–28; this sort of phraseology is, of course, missing from the φιλία καὶ συμμαχία inscriptions discussed above.

εἰρήνη καὶ φιλία καὶ συμμαχία between Astypalaea and the Roman People (IG 12.3.173, lines 3–4). In reality, this inscription records a formal treaty of alliance with Rome, complete with a full text of the contractual *foedus sociale* (lines 28–50).⁶⁹

Still, even the examples discussed immediately above serve only to demonstrate that the probable phraseology of the Pharos inscription, taken by itself (ἡ συμμαχία καὶ φιλία. . .), does not help us much in determining the exact nature of the diplomatic relationship between the Pharians and Rome. Perhaps this phraseology is merely an honorific way of referring to informal *amicitia*, a way of emphasizing a de facto closeness—or hoped-for closeness—between Pharos and Rome; there seem to be many parallels. But perhaps this phraseology really does refer to a formal treaty of alliance; there seem to be a few parallels for that usage as well. We cannot be sure.

If the discussion had to end here, the hypothesis of widespread early *foedera socialia* in Illyria and the Greek East, advanced on the basis of the Pharos inscription, would already be in deep trouble. We have seen that the Pharos inscription cannot be securely dated; and now we see that the relationship with Rome referred to on the Pharos inscription must itself be viewed as uncertain. These are poor evidentiary bases upon which to construct even a history of Rome's relations with Pharos, let alone to build a broad hypothesis concerning early Roman policy and diplomatic method in the East.

In fact, however, the conundrum of the Pharos inscription is not totally irresolvable, and the question at least of the character of the Pharians' relationship with Rome circa 219/8 can be definitively answered. The answer lies in the specific history of Pharos, and it completely excludes the possibility that Pharos possessed a *foedus sociale* with Rome during the 220s, a *foedus* that was renewed in 219/8. This conclusion will in turn have a powerful impact on how one should interpret the phraseology (and date) of the inscription.

Robert rejected a 219/8 date for the inscription in good part because he assumed that in 229/8 Rome had left Pharos to the dynast Demetrius, and thus 219/8 had to mark the first Roman-Pharian diplomatic contact and interaction. If, as he argued persuasively, the inscription probably proclaimed the restoration of a previously disrupted diplomatic relationship between Pharos and Rome, it could not date from 219/8.⁷⁰ Derow, however, rightly criticizes Robert for having ignored some important evidence here. Appian indicates that in 229 Demetrius surrendered Pharos directly to the Romans, in parallel with his surrender of Corcyra to them. It was all part of Demetrius' betrayal of the Illyrian monarchy, which was a crucial event in

69. Derow adduces as another example the new Maroneia inscription, from the 160s B.C.E., in which the relationship between Maroneia and Rome is called a φιλία καὶ συμμαχία (line 10), when in reality it is a *foedus sociale*, with a list of specific terms of alliance listed (lines 12–20 and 30–33) ("Pharos and Rome," p. 269, n. 25, and p. 270). But the actual description of the relationship between Maroneia and Rome on the inscription is the militaristic φιλία καὶ συμμαχία καλὴ καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλασσαν (lines 10–11), a most unusual formulation that can hardly be presented as parallel to the (evidently) brief language of the Pharos inscription.

70. See above, pp. 401 and 399–400.

the First Illyrian War.⁷¹ A little later, Appian adds that Corcyra, Epidamnus, Issa, and Pharos were Ῥωμαίων ὑπηκόοι (*Ill.* 7). If Appian is correct, then the Roman State did in fact have some sort of diplomatic interaction with the Pharians during the First Illyrian War; thus, if the Pharian inscription dates from 219/8, it does *not* date from a point in time when Rome and Pharos were engaging in diplomatic contact *ab initio*.⁷²

Robert certainly should have taken the information of Appian *Illyrica* 7 into account. But Derow then goes farther. He argues that the Appian material shows that Demetrius of Pharos was *never* lord of Pharos—not before 229, and not after. Pharos was not Demetrius' personal possession (gained no one knows how); in 229 he was merely its local governor on behalf of the monarchs of the Illyrian Ardiaei (ἡγούμενος Ἄγρωνι, App. *Ill.* 7), just as was the case at Corcyra (*ibid.*; cf. Polyb. 2.10.8). And after Demetrius surrendered Pharos to the Romans, it remained free both of Illyrian control and of Demetrius' personal control, though in a close connection with Rome (Ῥωμαίων ὑπηκόος, cf. App. *Ill.* 7). Although many prominent scholars have asserted that the Romans gave Pharos to Demetrius as part of the *δυναστεία* along the Illyrian coast that he received from them as his reward for betraying the Ardiaeans, Derow maintains that this is simply an assertion, without any support in the ancient evidence: "Polybius and Appian diverge on Rome's treatment of Demetrius after the war . . . but neither has the Romans handing Pharos over to him."⁷³

Indeed, according to Derow's proposal, Appian establishes that Pharos became a totally independent state in 229/8—and thus we are provided with the general diplomatic background for why Pharos received a *foedus sociale* from Rome (the *συμμαχία* of the inscription) in that year. The *foedus* was the means by which the Romans regulated their relationship with—and control over—the technically free Pharians.⁷⁴ It is true that in 219 Demetrius made Pharos his last refuge when Rome attacked him, but this does not show that Pharos had been his headquarters since 229/8, for he occupied the city by force, with Illyrian troops (cf. Polyb. 3.18.2 and 19.5–6, and App. *Ill.* 8). It is also true that the Roman invasion of the island unfortunately resulted in the destruction of Pharos city, even though Demetrius himself escaped to Macedon, but, Derow argues, the Romans recognized the innocence of the ruined Pharians in the events of 219, and hence, as the inscription records, restored the Pharians' previously existing relationship with Rome, including the *foedus sociale*.⁷⁵

This reconstruction of the history of Pharos between 229/8 and 219/8 has its attractions. Clearly it was not good methodology for scholars simply to

71. Δημήτριος δ' ὁ Φάρου ἡγούμενος Ἄγρωνι (Φάρου τε γὰρ αὐτῆς ἥρχε, καὶ ἐπὶ τῆδε Κορκύρας) παρέδωκεν ἅμω Ῥωμαίοις ἐπιπλέουσιν ἐκ προδοσίας (App. *Ill.* 7). There are clearly authentic elements in Appian's account of the outbreak and course of the First Illyrian War, so this information should be taken seriously: see, convincingly, P. S. Derow, "Clemporus," *Phoenix* 27 (1973): 118–34. (Not that Appian should be preferred to Polybius, however, see p. 414 below, and n. 86).

72. Cf. Derow, "Pharos and Rome," 265–66.

73. *Ibid.*, 265.

74. *Ibid.*, 265–66 and 270.

75. *Ibid.*, 265–66.

assert that Demetrius of Pharos (ὁ Φάριος, Polyb. 2.10.8; App. *Ill.* 7) was the ruler of Pharos.⁷⁶ And Derow's reconstruction would provide us with a coherent reason why the συμμω[χία καὶ φιλία of the Pharos inscription, if it is a *foedus sociale*, was being renewed in 219/8 (if it is 219/8). Yet Derow himself has failed here to take vital information into account. It derives not from Appian but from our best source, Polybius, and it proves that Pharos was indeed the personal possession of Demetrius between 229/8 and 219, that Demetrius of Pharos *was* lord of Pharos.

Demetrius was no minor figure in Polybius' *Histories*. Rather, Polybius believed that Demetrius had played a central role in world-historical events, by convincing Philip V of Macedon in 217 to turn his field of conquest from Greece to Illyria and the West, against a Rome now weakened by defeats in the Hannibalic War. Philip's aggression set off a Roman counterreaction that led almost immediately to the First Macedonian War, and ultimately to the establishment of Roman hegemony over Greece.⁷⁷ In discussing the crucial historical moment of Philip's "turn to the West" in 217, Polybius therefore offers his audience first a detailed psychological portrait of the young Macedonian king (5.102.1),⁷⁸ and then a detailed explication of Demetrius' motives: why he "inflamed" Philip's mind for this project until it was all Philip could think about (5.108.5–7). Demetrius, Polybius says, did not advise Philip to turn towards the West out of consideration for the king's own interests; this did not rank above third in order of importance to Demetrius in his actions (5.108.6). A stronger motive was his great hostility towards the Romans (*ibid.*). Polybius continues, "But most of all he acted for his own sake and his own hopes, for he was convinced that only in this way could he regain his principality on Pharos" (5.108.7):

μόνος γὰρ οὕτως ἐπέπειστο τὴν ἐν τῷ Φάρῳ δυναστείαν κατακτήσασθαι πάλιν.

This is decisive. Polybius was extraordinarily well informed on the career of Demetrius of Pharos: he had Roman sources and Greek ones, written sources and oral information.⁷⁹ Moreover, Polybius lived in an intellectual milieu much given to ridicule of major errors of fact in history writing.⁸⁰ It is therefore inconceivable that in giving his audience what he believed to be Demetrius' primary motive for inflaming Philip V's ambitions in the West—

76. Asserted without argument by de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani* 3:1 (n. 20 above), p. 302 and n. 98; Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce*, 105, cf. *The Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 7 (Cambridge, 1928), 835; Badian, *Studies*, 8; Hammond, "Illyris, Rome, and Macedon" (n. 47 above), 7; Petzold, "Rom und Illyrien" (n. 5 above), 214.

77. For Demetrius' place in Polybius' *Histories*, see A. M. Eckstein, "Polybius, Demetrius of Pharos, and the Origins of the Second Illyrian War," *CP* 89, 1 (1994): 46–59. For detailed discussion of Philip's decision of 217, see Walbank, *Philip V*, 64–67; for its world-historical importance in Polybius' eyes, see F. W. Walbank, "Symptoke: Its Role in Polybius' *Histories*," in *Studies in Greek and Roman History and Historiography: Selected Papers* (Cambridge, 1985): 313–24, first published in *YCIS* 24 (1975): 199–214.

78. On the ideological thrust of this passage, see A. M. Eckstein, "Hannibal at New Carthage: Polyb. 3.15 and the Power of Irrationality," *CP* 84, 1 (1989): 10–12.

79. On Polybius' sources for Demetrius of Pharos' career, see Eckstein, "Demetrius" (n. 77 above), esp. 56–57.

80. See Polybius' own harsh criticism of Philinus of Agrigentum (1.14 *passim* and 3.26.1–5) and Zeno and Antisthenes of Rhodes (16.14–20) on this point, with the comments of K. Meister, *Historische Kritik bei Polybios* (Wiesbaden, 1975), 27–47 and 173–78.

an act with world-historical consequences—Polybius would allow himself to be mistaken on such a basic fact as what had constituted the geographical and political center of Demetrius' *δυναστεία* in the Adriatic down to 219. It was Pharos.

The term ὁ Φάρος (Polyb. 5.108.7) means the island,⁸¹ but we can assume that Polybius is including the city of Pharos (ἡ Φάρος⁸²) in his statement. First, 5.108.7 is merely a general geographical indication to his audience of the center of Demetrius' power before 219—namely, Pharos—and for this purpose a reference to the city would be superfluous. Second, it would hardly make geopolitical sense if the center of Demetrius' power before 219 was Pharos and yet did *not* include the city, which was the main institution on the island. And third, Polybius had already established in his narrative of the First Illyrian War that Demetrius was the key figure in the city itself. After recounting the arrival of strong Roman forces in northern Illyria during the campaign of 229 and their breaking of the Illyrian siege of Issa (2.11.11), Polybius reports that some of the Illyrian besiegers fled to Pharos, and: τῶν δὲ πολιορκούντων τὴν Ἴσσαν οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ Φάρῳ διὰ τὸν Δημήτριον ἀβλαβεῖς ἔμειναν (2.11.15). The most natural way to translate this passage is: "Of the besiegers of Issa, those who fled to the city of Pharos (ἐν τῇ Φάρῳ) remained there by permission of Demetrius."⁸³ Now, Demetrius had last been seen in the narrative of 229 guiding the Romans north from Corcyra (2.11.6); here we have what seems a direct Polybian statement that he was ruler of Pharos city at that time. Even if one chooses to take Polyb. 2.11.15 to mean that Demetrius used his influence with the *Romans* so that these Illyrians remained in safety in Pharos (which the Greek certainly does not require), we would still possess a statement that the Romans in 229 viewed Demetrius as the natural spokesman for conditions in the city.⁸⁴ And just two sentences later, Polybius says that Demetrius was given a μεγάλη *δυναστεία* along the Illyrian coast as a reward for his having gone over to the Romans (2.11.17). This is precisely the *δυναστεία*, now specifically said to be centered on Pharos, referred to in 5.108.7. Polybius is completely consistent; it would not have occurred to him—or to his readers—that anyone would think that the city of Pharos had not been the center of Demetrius' personal realm in Illyria after 229.⁸⁵

If Appian directly disagreed with Polybius about the fate of Pharos in 229/8, we would still prefer the information of Polybius.⁸⁶ But in fact, the information in Appian is not necessarily incongruent with what appears in

81. See F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1957), 163–64.

82. *Ibid.*

83. So M. H. Chambers, trans., *Polybius: The "Histories,"* ed. E. Badian (New York, 1966), 70; cf. G. B. Cardona, trans., *Polibio di Megalopoli: "Storie,"* vol. 1 (Naples, 1948), 128.

84. Cf. E. S. Shuckburgh, trans., *The "Histories" of Polybius*, vol. 1 (London and New York, 1889), 110; W. R. Paton, trans., *Polybius: The "Histories,"* vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA, 1922), 267; H. Drexler, trans., *Polybios: "Geschichte,"* vol. 1 (Zurich and Stuttgart, 1961), 119; D. Roussel, trans., *Polybe: "Histoire" (Paris, 1970), 108; P. Pédech, trans., Polybe: "Histoires, Livre 2" (Paris, 1970), 49; I. Scott-Kilvert, trans., Polybius: The Rise of the Roman Empire (Harmondsworth, England, 1979), 122.*

85. Derow, "Pharos and Rome," takes no account either of Polyb. 5.108.7 or of Polyb. 2.11.15.

86. See the judicious general assessment of sources on Illyria by R. M. Errington in *The Cambridge Ancient History*², vol. 8 (Cambridge, 1989), 87–88.

Polybius. According to Appian, some of the Illyriote cities surrendered to Rome or were surrendered by Demetrius, and later, Queen Teuta of the Ardiaei was told that these places were now Ῥωμαίων ὑπηκόοι (*Ill.* 7). The list included Pharos (*ibid.*). But in Appian this does not end the diplomatic interaction between Rome and the Illyriotes. He goes on to say that the Romans then “freed” Corcyra and Apollonia, and left other places to Demetrius (*Ill.* 8). If Appian is correct that Demetrius surrendered Pharos to Rome in 229 (and we cannot be sure of this, given Polyb. 2.11.15), it is thus reasonable to conclude that—even in Appian—the Romans then gave it back to him.⁸⁷ Some such scenario is in fact suggested by Appian’s later description of the conduct of the Pharians in 219. Derow believes that Demetrius occupied a free and sovereign Pharos by force in 219, in order to turn it into a last refuge from the Romans.⁸⁸ But there is no hint of forcible occupation in our sources, including Appian. On the contrary, Appian says that the Pharians were “fellow-culprits” with Demetrius in his rebellion against Rome (συναμαρτοῦσαν), which is exactly why the Romans burnt the city to the ground (*Ill.* 8). The most natural explanation for Demetrius’ making Pharos city his base in 219 is that it had always been the capital of his domain, and his principal residence.⁸⁹

* * *

With these findings, the hypothesis of widespread Roman *foedera socialia* in Illyria in the third century B.C.E. collapses. The evidence is overwhelming that the city of Pharos was the centerpiece of Demetrius of Pharos’ personal *δυναστεία* in Illyria in 229/8–219 B.C.E., that Demetrius was the sovereign ruler of Pharos during these years. It is therefore impossible that Pharos was simultaneously a free and sovereign state (i.e., a state not subject to Demetrius) with a legally binding *foedus sociale* with Rome: for it was a fundamental principle of Roman foreign relations that one could not enter into a *foedus*-relationship with a community that was subordinated to another (i.e., more powerful) entity, and hence was not *in sua potestate*.⁹⁰ With the possibility that Pharos had a *foedus sociale* with Rome between 229/8 and 219 now eliminated, there is no longer the slightest reason to argue that any of the other Illyriote cities in this period (or any of the inland tribes) was in possession of a formal *foedus sociale*. Pharos can no longer serve as a possible model or example of this relationship; it cannot serve as a possible counterweight to the repeated references in our ancient sources to Roman relationships of mere *φιλία/amicitia* along the Adriatic coast, nor can it point to a legalistic explanation for the occasional and minor military

87. This is the reconstruction of events offered by Holleaux in *CAH* 7 (note 76 above), 835.

88. Derow, “Pharos and Rome,” 265–66.

89. Cf. Polyb. 3.18.2 and 8, where Demetrius is depicted as directing that a large garrison be placed in Pharos in anticipation of the Romans’ arrival in Illyria: the assumption in Polybius is clearly that Pharos is part of Demetrius’ realm. Further, in Polybius’ account, Demetrius’ garrison sallies from the city with no evident worry about any problem at their backs (3.18.12–19.7), and when the sally is defeated by the Romans, the city accepts back into it that part of the garrison that flees to it (19.7). This all fits with Appian’s comment.

90. See Nörr, *Aspekte des römischen Völkerrechts* (n. 13 above), 17; cf. T. Mommsen, *Römisches Staatsrecht*, vol. 3, part 1 (Leipzig, 1887), 1150.

aid the Illyriotes are recorded as having provided Rome during Rome's wars with Philip V, Antiochus III, and Perseus.

Conversely, the finding that Demetrius of Pharos was the sovereign ruler of Pharos in 229/8–219 B.C.E. has a powerful impact on how we understand the Pharos inscription itself. Letter forms and scribal usages could date the inscription anywhere from the late third century B.C.E. down into the mid-second century. But if the situation at Pharos implied on the inscription fits well with the disastrous events of 219 (as it does), and if the inscription refers to a previous relationship with Rome as having been renewed (as seems likely), then the *συμμο[χία καὶ φιλία]* of the inscription can now only be viewed as merely an honorific way of expressing informal *amicitia* between Pharos and Rome: it cannot be referring in 219 to the renewal of a *foedus sociale*. The Pharian inscription would thus become the earliest example of the inflated *φιλία/amicitia* rhetoric towards Rome which was to have a long inscriptional history in the Greek East.⁹¹ This relationship of *φιλία/amicitia* could have had its origins in the period between Demetrius' surrender of Pharos to the Romans in summer 229 and their return of the city and island to him soon thereafter (if such a surrender occurred). Or perhaps the claim that the Romans were renewing friendship was based simply on their previous relationship with Demetrius: he had been their friend (though it had ended badly); it would follow that his subjects had been their friends also.⁹²

There is no epigraphical reason, however, why the Pharos inscription could not be placed sixty or seventy years later, in the mid-second century B.C.E. In that case, it would have no relevance to the earliest stages of Roman expansion in the Greek East. But the problem is that we know of no disaster to Pharos in the second century, let alone one involving the Romans (as the inscription indicates). There was fighting on the southern Illyrian coast during the Third Macedonian War (172–168), and this was one of Robert's suggested contexts for the inscription, but our quite full sources on these operations never refer to any operations in the vicinity of Pharos.⁹³ The obscure mid-second-century Illyrian warlord Ballaios had some sort of conflict with Pharos, but to connect this with the events referred to on the inscription is very speculative.⁹⁴ The most plausible second-century context for the inscription is thus the Roman war with the Dalmatians in 156–155. Dalmatian raids were causing severe trouble for the northern Illyriote cities in the 150s (e.g., Issa, Polyb. 32.9.1), and a (voluntary?) Pharian *deditio* to Roman forces operating in the region might conceivably have happened then. The absence of information about Pharos in our sources for the Dal-

91. See above, pp. 406–11.

92. Dio calls Demetrius' relationship with the Romans *φιλία* (frag. 53; cf. Zonar. 8.20), and that is also the implication of Polyb. 3.16.4. *Amicitia* with Rome, of course, could be said by willing partners to arise out of any variety of possible diplomatic situations: see Heuss, *Grundlagen*, 26–52 and 79–83 for detailed discussion.

93. For the suggestion, see Robert, "Inscriptions, 1960," 540 (hesitant). For sources on the fighting on the Adriatic coast in 168, see T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, vol. 1 (Cleveland, 1951), 428 (under L. Anicius Gallus).

94. Robert, "Inscriptions, 1960," 540, leans towards possible Roman and Pharian troubles with Ballaios as the background for the situation on the inscription; but we have no evidence of Roman involvement with Ballaios.

matian War is less of an obstacle than for 172–168, since the sources are so scanty.⁹⁵

A date in the 150s for the inscription would allow chronological room for the Romans to have concluded at some previous time a *foedus sociale* with Pharos (which a 219/8 date does not). One might then be more free to interpret ἡ συμμα[χία καὶ φιλία on the inscription as referring to the renewal of a legally binding alliance; but the introduction of the Romans as mere φί[λοι of the Pharians still argues strongly against this. Even if the inscription dates from the 150s, therefore, its first lines can equally be seen as merely referring in honorific terms to what was informal *amicitia* with Rome.

But the hypothesis that the inscription dates from 219/8 B.C.E. remains the most economical way of dealing with all our evidence about the history of Pharos in the third and second centuries. Indeed, the case for 219/8 is greatly strengthened by the above demonstration that the inscription does not necessarily imply a Rome-Pharos treaty of alliance. This removes strong historical objections (starting with Polyb. 5.108.7) to a 219/8 dating. The whole matter remains difficult, but the idea that the inscription is referring (briefly) to a “renewing” of informal *amicitia* between Rome and Pharos after the disaster to Pharos during the Second Illyrian War is highly attractive.

One final point: For understanding the character of early Roman hegemony in Illyria, a crucial aspect of the inscription is the Pharians’ interactions with the other Greek states mentioned on the stone, Paros and (in all probability) Athens.⁹⁶ The interactions are those of a completely independent state. The inscription has a brief celebration of the return of Pharian freedom from the Romans, but then it gives far more attention and praise to the people of Paros and Athens, as well as to Apollo of Delphi, for their help to the city. Moreover, the Pharians make their own decision to ask the Parians and Athenians for help (A, lines 9–22: the Romans are nowhere involved); the Parians treat the Pharian ambassadors as envoys from a highly respected and free polis (A, lines 22–41, and B, lines 4–12); when the Parians make their own decision to help Pharos, they use the same formula of democratic decision making as the one employed by the Pharians in deciding to ask for help (A, line 9, and A, lines 40–41); when the Parians decide to strengthen Paros (including with new colonists), the Romans are nowhere consulted (A, lines 40–41), and elsewhere the Parians simply assume there is an equality of status between themselves and Pharos (B, lines 3–4).

Perhaps all this is simply formal political and diplomatic *politesse*. But Ferrary has argued that the Romans’ appearance in the treaty between Philip V and Hannibal as κύριοι of the Illyriote states (Polyb. 7.9.13: 215 B.C.E.) and the apparent absence of those states from the peace treaty between Rome and Philip V in 205 demonstrate that to outsiders the Illyriotes were officially viewed as Rome’s subjects.⁹⁷ It is an important argument, but our inscription provides a major counterbalance to it, showing not only that the

95. Sources on the Dalmatian War: see Broughton, *MRR*, I (n. 93 above), 447 (for 156 B.C.E.), and 448 (for 155 B.C.E.).

96. On Athens, see n. 11 above.

97. Ferrary, *Philhellénisme et impérialisme*, 24–32.

Pharians insisted that their relationship with Rome was one of friendship, but that outsiders such as the Parians officially viewed Pharos as a fully independent state. If the Pharos inscription dates from 219/8 (as seems likely), this is a striking finding. It is even more striking if the inscription dates from seventy years later.⁹⁸

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